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NATO EXPANSION DURING THE COLD WAR
AND AFTER
Evan Jaroff
N ATO has undergon e five ro unds of e nlarge m en t sin ce its inception in 194 <), and it is
poised to unde rgo another ro und q uite shortly , since Albania and C ro atia signe d accessio n
protocols in 200tl. In order to und erstand future expa nsio ns , in clu ding th e proj ected entry
of Alban ia and C ro atia, it is helpful to examine th e history of N ATO enlargeme nt, and in
parti cular the criteri a used to identi fy potential new me m bers and th e process that they must
under go in o rde r to j oin th e All ian ce . This pa per demo nstrates th at accession criter ia used
during th e Cold War, altho ug h ne ver ex plici tly o u tline d , we re quite sim ilar to th e suggeste d
criteri a laid o ut in ;1 1995 rep ort (Study on E nlarge me nt ) that w as used to eva luate potential
new m ember states for th e accessio ns of 19<) () and 2004. H o we ver , afte r the Cold W ar th e
actual process o f accession became more stru ctu red , regulated , and stringen t. U nd er stand ing
N ATO ex pa nsio n In th e past w ill help shed some light on how new member states co uld
be admitted in th e future.
NATO's FOUNDING MEMBER STATES
Issues o f NATO ex pansio n arose ev en before access io n talks w ith Greece and Turkey
in 1<)52, sinc e the first real in stance of enla rgem ent occurred after the " W ashingt on Exp lo r-
ato ry T alks o n Security" (W ET ), which were nego tiatio ns (held betw een 1<)48 and 1949)
leadi ng up to NATO 's fo un di ng .1 These n egoti ati ons prod uced th e "Washington Pa per"
(in Sep tem be r 194 tl). whi ch di scu ssed th e states th at wo uld be include d ,IS foundin g m ein-
bel'S o f th e N o rth A tlant ic Treaty Organiz atio n ." It laid o ut three g ro ups of co untries and
dubbed them the " har d co re, th e ste pping sto nes, and th e go ats" (Smith 26) . The United
States, Ca nada, the United Kin gdom, France, the Netherl an ds, Belgiu lll . and Luxem bo urg
made up th e hard co re states, which " share d co m m o n st rat egic and ideological co ncerns ,
an d wo uld fo rm a close assoc iatio n that w ou ld be at the heart o f the North Atl anti c Treaty"
(Sm ith 26) . N orway, D enma rk , Icelan d, Ireland, and Po rt ugal w ere th e stepp ing stones
states, whose geogr'lp hic locat ions nude them o f strategic , mil itar y impo rtance. T he fin al
gro up , th e goats, was co m prised of Italy, Turkey, and G reece. None o f th ese three states
"fit th e te rm "North Atla nt ic ' III it s ge ograp hic al or strategi c articu lat io ns, o r (in the G ree k
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After
56 EVAN JAROFF Clarem ont McKenna College
an d Turkish cases) its id eol ogical o nes, but wer e nonetheless of key im po rtance to W este rn
Eu rope" (Smith 27) .
ITALY'S INCLUSION IN NATO
Ital y' s in clusion as a founding member of NATO is a particularl y interesting e lse , sin ce
it was "the clear est de pa rtu re from the geograph ical co ncept of th e N orth Atl antic Tre.r-
ry, and th us is clear ev ide nce of th e polit ical cr ite ria for membership" (Sm ith 57). When
th e "hard co re " stat es de liber ated ove r wh ich " ot he r" or "add itio na l" stares to include in
NATO , th ey did not have clear cr iteria to guide th eir evaluatio n (Sm ith 29) . This was
qui te e vide nt in Italy' s case, whi ch was largely acce pted becau se of Rom e 's stro ng desire to
j o in NAT O , and in flueutial Fren ch support. T he italian s ~ rgued th at " Italy was, by d in t o f
'he r civili sat ion and he r mercantile and m arit im e tradit io ns' a W este rn Eu ro pean co untry"
(Smith 30). However, th e US an d UK worri ed that inco rporating Italy Into NATO could
lead to an overex te nsio n of their military capab iliti es if th e lt alian s neede d mili tary assistanc e .
Although thi s w as a valid co nce rn , it feU to the back ground as th e Fren ch backed Italy ill
part because including the stat e in NATO wo uld make it more d ifficu lt to excl ude Algeri a
(then a Fr en ch col ony) from th e o rganizatio n 111 the future (Smi th 35) . The French m ad e
it cle ar th at th ey stro ngly supported Italy's cause, and w he n th e Italian ambassador sign aled
Italy 's desire for N AT O m embershi p to th e US State De partme nt , it was a big ste p toward s
its eventual inclusion .
By d irectly appealin g to th e United States , ltal y ackno w ledged Washi ngton 's ke y rol e
in th e acc essio n decision . Italy was " heavily dependen t o n th e U S fo r aid in its post- war
reconstru cti on " an d felt th at j o ining N ATO wo uld help en sur e th at US-Itali~n rela tions
remained friendly (Sm ith 37 ). Italy would also ec onomically be nefit fro m close r relat io ns
wit h other NATO m ember states, usin g th e US as a springboard. Italy placed th e Am eri cans
in a rather peril ous positio n by giving th e U S th e final decision in th eir accession . If th e U S
chose to exclude Italy, then it wo uld not o n ly co u nter stro ng Fren ch suppo rt , but it also ran
the risk of sett ing a p receden t for which co unt ries would be denied in th e fut ure . M oreo ver,
ex clud ing Italy cou ld h ave swayed the coun try to side w ith th e Sov iet Union in the future,
so me thing that nei th er th e U S nor W estern Eu rope wan ted to happ en . Ul timately , th e U S
recomm ended th at Italy join N AT O based o n a relati ve consensus am ong th e " hard core"
states, th e formal Italian requ est to join th e o rgan izat io n , and th e possible geopo litica l con-
seq ue nce s of rejecti ng a state .
The co nseque nces of rej ecting a state's bid to j oin NATO were taken ve ry serio usly
during th e Cold W ar , which helps explai n w hy th er e is no evi de nce of un successful ap-
plications for en try into NATO during this perio d. As allud ed to w ith respect to Italy,
th e conseq ue nces of an un su ccessful, delayed , or w ithd raw n appli cation co uld threaten the
o rganiza tio n's vitality. George Kennan . a member of the State Depa rtme nt tha t negoti ated
the N orth Atlan tic T reaty, po ints o ut that if" ind ivid udl co un tries rejected m embership o r
were refused m embership, th e Russians co uld make political cap ital out of thi s, either way"
(Sm ith 23) . 1n other words, NA T O no t o nly had to be careful abo u t dealin g with stat es that
ac tive ly so ugh t NATO m embership du ring th e Cold Wa r, but it also had to be parti cular
about inviting states to join th e Alliance so that the o rga nizatio n would not be em ba rrassed
by a rej ection .
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ACCESSION CRITERIA DURING THE COLD WAR
The guid u lg princip le used to det ermine whi ch states would j oin NATO is o u tlined
in Article 10 o f the Washingt ou Treaty (also kn o w n us th e North Atlantic Treaty) , which
states :
'T he Patties ilia)', by unanimous ayteeuwm, invite '1IIy other European S tate ill a
position to jimhcr II,e priuciplcs (!( this Treal)' and 10 contribut« 10 tlu: sccurit» (2f
tlu: North Atlnntic area 10 accede 10 tltis Trcatv, AllY State so invited lIIay become
,7 Part y 10 the T reatv b)' dl'posil i ll)!. its i nst ru ment ~r accession willi II,e GOIJCrrI/l/Cll1
o( tlu: United S tates oiA nicrica?
Alth ough this article mentions th at the member states must un animously ag re e to in-
vit e potential states to become NATO members, it does not outline specific cr it eria upon
which to base suc h in vitati ons. Du e to its vagueness. diplomats and scho lars d eb ated what
th e crite ria fo r a perspective NATO member stare sho uld be . Kennan argu ed th at NATO
membership sho u ld be ex tended o nly to co u n tr ies " w hose sho res w er e wa shed by th e wa-
ters o f th e North Atl anti c" (quoted in Sm ith 23) . Sc ho lar Mark Sm ith notes th at Kennan 's
criteri a, based purely o n geograph y, wou ld have th e advantages of "(a) being clea rly a de-
fensive pact and th er efore not likel y to pr o vok e rh e So viet Union into a sort of co m petit ion
for allies: and (h) possessing so lid ly d elineated membe rship cri te ria and th erefore not su bject
to grey areas" (23). H o w ever , as ev ide nc ed b y Ital y's inclusio n in NATO (and rhe later ac-
cession o f Greece and Turkey), Kennan's geographical criteria w ere not ad opted as th e basis
for NATO expansion during th e Cold War. In o rde r to better und erstand th e process and
criteri a used to de tcrmine NATO m ember stares during rhi s era, ir is helpful to o bserve th e
accessio n o f Greece and Turkey in 1952.
THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY (1952)
Foll owing W o rld War II, Turkey underwent a period o f modernization and \V esr-
ernizati on , underl in ed by C old W ar politics th at placed grea ter Importance o n alliances
and allegia nces, rathe r than neutral ism . Turkey so ug ht NATO membersh ip nor only for
th e secu rity gua rallt ee artic ulate d under Arr icle 5 o f th e N orth Arlanric Trea ty , but also ro
gJiu closer tics ro th e United States and \Vesrern Eu rope." Greece, howe ver, srruggled afie r
WWIl from th e catastro p hic dama ge wroughr by the civil w ar that occurred from 194()-
194 9 (Sm ith 57 ). The Truman D o ctrine, w h ich so ught ro limit th e spread o f Conu muu sm ,
pr o vided Greece w irh co nsiderab le finan cial and political aid . The threat o f Comm unism
pr op agat ed the notion that NATO ne eded ro w iden irs sco pe and better secu re th e territo ry
und er irsjurisdicri on (Smi th HH). Base d OIl thi s idea, the Un ired States argu ed that " G reece
an d Turkey need ed ro he defended and rightly linked ro th e western fold , and rhis carn e to
m ean that rhey need ed to be inilitaril» protect ed" (Sm irh ( 5).
The United Stares W ;IS th e main proponent for both Turk ish and Gree k accessio n .
G ree ce and Tu rkey w ere important ro th e U S because of rheir link to rh e Eastern M edire r-
ran can , the Middle East, and o il (Sm ith ( 7). The U S had strategic interests in both " e nsu r-
in g that the Greek milirary could maintain an internal order hlvo llr . ble to th e West; an d .. .
m aintaining rh e capa bility of th e Turkish m ilirury to resist Sovie t political pressure and pos-
sible milira ry arrack " (Sm irh (7) . Also , th e Unired Sta tes saw extend ing NATO membershi p
to Greece and Turkey as ,I ben efit , because " if Greece and /o r Turkey o pred for neutral-
ism (m ore lik ely in Turkey's case) , or were so m eho w dra wn into th e Soviet sp here (more
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likely IJ1 Gr eece' s case) , this could pot entially he the beginning of a spread ing tenden cy In
the Mediterranean ,Ind Middle East" (Sm ith (3). As th e grea test supporter of enlargem ent,
th e U S also played a key role m L cilitat ing, and influ en cin g, Turkish and C reek accession.
The Creek and Turkish accessions were de cid ed at a full uunisre rial m eeting of the
N orth Atlanti c Council (N AC) by a co nsensus vote. However, before this meetin g took
place, a gre,lt deal of co nversatio n occur red w ithin th e C o unc il of Deput ies and th e Stand-
ing Croup, ' The C ou ncil of D eputi es was " the pl'lll1<lry co nduit throu gh which dipl omats
voiced th e positi on s of their gov erruucnts, hut also throu gh which th e w eigh t o f intra-
Alliance o pinio n could be brou ght horne to governments themselves " (Sm ith 75). The
Stand ing Gro up, com prised of th e United States, France, and Crear Britain , "exercised
almost so le dcfar,» responsibili ty for th e fo rma tio n of NATO strategy " until th e establish-
n ienr of Suprem e Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SH APE) in 195 1 (Sm ith 75). The
Standing C roup wielded innnen se powe r, since other " NATO m embers would he relu ctant
to block a Joint position by th e U S, Britain and France, and therefore ... co nse nsus- bnild ing
would likely begin with thes e three" (Smith 75). As "NATO's definiti ve m ember, " U S
decisions held th e most wei ght in m eetings within NAT O and the Standing C roup (Smith
R9). Ultimately, th e accession of T u rkey and Gr eece carne down to th e Ameri can decision
to support th ei r ent ry. Even th ough the Briti sh w ere ini tially againsr Turkish and Creek
admission , Am erican backing mad e th em change th ei r position , which in turn influenced
other m em ber states to agr ee to th e accession in 1952 .0
THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1955)
Much of th e debate surro unding the acc ession of the FRC arose from uncertainty
abo ut ho w to solve th e " G erm an Question ." Essentially, European powers were unsure
how to incorporate Cermany in to the internation al co unu u ni ty after W orld War II. In
the past, C erma ny " had been to o po werful to easily fit int o th e Europ ean system , hut not
powerful eno ugh to dominate the system by hegem onic o ve rlay" (Sm ith 121) . NATO
member states were hesitant to allow for German rearm am ent , but under th e o rganizatio n 's
new forward strategy, adopted in 1950, a Cenuau military force wou ld be alm ost essential .
German y's strategic case for accessio n was based 0 11 thi s strategy , which called for defending
"E uro pe as [ It to the East as possible , and no furth er \X/est than th e Rhine River" (Smith
103). T he refo re , including a mil itaril y defensi ble FR C in NATO w as vital, since the "for-
wa rd strategy would be geograph ically and materi ally un w orkable wi tho ut Cerm an ni eu i-
bersh ip and co ntribution" (Smith 124).
AJon g with its strat egi c im portance. th e FRC 's m embership in NATO w ould be <I n
exten sion of Chancellor Ad eu auer's policy of W csrern ization. Ad cnau er fel t that the only
way "G er m any could re-establi sh itself as a legitimate actor and recon cile old enmities W J S
to be ' the m ost European nation among Europ ean s.' ''7 Adcnauer saw NATO membership
as a key to Germ any's successful inco rpo ration (in Europ e) and reh abilitation (post-WWlI ),
since it would be ,I " clear sign o f its Western vo cation and . .. a cru cial part of Adenauers pol-
icy of em bedding the Fed eral R epubli c into th e emerging polit ico-econ omic blo c in \X/est
Europ e" (Smi th 125). Th e U nit ed States was well ,1ware of th e strategic significance (both
militarily and politically) of in cluding the FRC in NATO, and it was up to the Ameri can s
again to garn e r support for thi s cnlargcmcur.
The pr ocess of C e1111an accession W<l S m or e com plicated and drawn out than th e ac-
cessio n of Greece and Tu rkey, since th e US faced st ro ng Fren ch resistance early on . Early
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m eet in gs o f th e NAC saw N ATO m embers pu shing for tw o different st rateg ies. Some all ies
favored " the e n ticing prospect o f forwa rd d efe nce w ith an in crea sed US military presence
In Europe" while others feared "a co rresp o ndi ng de m and for markedl y in creased European
defence spe nd ing; and th e looming prospect of Cerman rearmament" (Smith [(4). The
French prop osed th e Plev en P lan as an alternative ; thi s called for th e c reatio n of a Eu ropean
Defence Con n n u n iry (E DC) w ith ;1 European arluy comprised o f both French and C eriu an
troops, co n trolled by a European Defen ce Minister (Sm ith 1( 7) . T he French su pp o rt ed this
plan be cau se it to ok po w er away from an ind e pe nden t German milirary, w h ic h wo u ld pre-
vent the p ossibility of armed G erm an aggression against th e French in th e future .
After the failure of th e Pl evcn Plan, Presid ent Truman tri ed to sw ay th e A lli es in tIVor
o f G erman accessio n by pointin g o u t the importance of Ccnuan co n t ribu tio ns to NATO's
forward st rategy . Truman proclaimed , " A ny m ap w ill sh o w it , and a little ar ithmetic will
pro ve w ha t th e additi on of Cerm an manpower m eans to th e stre ngt h o f th e j oint defence
of Europe" (q u o ted in Smi t h 105). The US also sw ayed NAT O m embers by deruoustrating
the organizati on's utility ill answ e ring th e " G erman Quest ion ." By joini ng NATO , " G e r-
many's military power w ould he c1/!/l/llc/crf through the multilateral apparat us o f SH A PE,
hut it w o uld also be su bo rd ina te d to th e po w er o f the US" (Smi th 121-122). T h e French
proposed EDC did not ha ve th e sallie me.ius of managing Ge rm an strength , w hic h was a
rea son w hy the NATO m e mbers decided to include G erman y ill th e o rga n iza t io n in 1955 . ~
Also, w he n th e Fren ch Parliament tliled to ra t ify the EDC Treat y , the m ember states threw
their support behind G ermany' s entry into NATO.
THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN (1982)
Spa in 's late accession into NATO w as largely du e to its p olitical hi sto ry under Fran-
cis co Franco , w ho rul ed from 1936 until 1975. Spa in wa s " clea rly a Western European state
in geographi cal and hi stori ca l terms," but its tumultu ous re lat io nsh ip with its nei ghbors,
due to th e nature of Fran co' s regime, "pre vented Spain fro m becoming politi call y accepted
by th e rest o f Western Europe" (Smith 127). Again, alth ou gh the "British, Fr en ch and U S
militari es (the three k ey pl ayers in earl v NATO strategi c planning) were parti cularly keen
for Spa in to be admitted as a military nccessit y].]" Franco's di ctatorship act ed as an obstacl e
to its e n try (Sm it h 130) . H o w ever, during Franco 's rei gn , Spa in be cam e mi litaril y align ed
with th e U ni ted States th rou gh the Mad rid Pacts , w hich pa ved th e wa y for e ve nt ua l Spanish
accession afte r the country 's transition to dem ocracy.
Spain and the United States agreed to the Madrid Pact s in 1953 , w hi c h " w ere in es-
sence an exch ange : Spai n o b tained eco no mic aid 111 exc ha nge for allowing the US to use
na val and air bases 0 11 Spa n ish so il" (Sm ith 13 1). The U S used these agr eements to "secure
Spain as a st rate g ic p oint in th e C old W ar via bilateralismj .] " but o the r than eco no m ic sup-
port, Spa in recei ved n o sec u ri ty g uara ntee (Sm ith 131). Fundamentall y, Spa in w as part o f
the N orth Atlantic military system, but it w as not a m ember of NATO . Spain cont inu ed to
st re ngthe n its ties with NATO and th e rest ofEurope over the next twenty-five years , since
" the fac iJit ies it granted Iunder th e Madrid Pacts] had become an integral part of NATO
st rategy and war planning .. . [and] Spain 's o w n navy and ai r force w er e ... in creasingly ali gn ed
w it h th ose o f th e Alli an ce in terms of procedure , st ructure , and e ven lan guage" (Smi th 13 5).
Therefore, Spanish acce ssio n wa s not heavil y based o n NATO strat egy to increase its reach
or military capabiliti es, since it alr eady achieved thi s throu gh the M ad rid Pa ct s. In stead , th e
ke y to Spain ' s accession was the government's demo crati c transition afte r Franco's d eath in
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1'-)75.
O nce Spain becam e a dem ocracy, the U S and other NATO member state s had littl e
trouble j ustifying it s entry into tile organ izatio n . O u ting the 1 '-)70, and especially th e 1'-)80s ,
Eu ropea n governm cll ts began focusing on fost e ring greate r co hesio n and co o peratio n
,llllo ng th eir ne ig hb ors, based o n a fo und ation of sha red values (like democracy), throu gh
mem bershi p ill in sti tuti o ns like th e Europea n E cono m ic Com m u nity and NATO ." M em-
be rship in th ese tw o o rganizatio ns went almost hand in hand , and Spa in sough t acc eptanc e
into bo th as a means o f fittin g inro th e Eu ropean co u uu u uiry after decad es u nd er Fran co 's
repr essive rul e. J o in ing NATO w o uld help Spain becom e closer to Europe , and help un ite
E uro pe . However, th ere W ,IS som e d isagreement wit hin the Spa n ish state b y so cialists and
co ru ru unists who felt that j oining NATO wo uld "raise the level of tension between th e
rival power blocs and w o uld m ak e Spain a m ore likely target in any future co nfl ic t w ith the
Sovie t U n io n. "1 11 T hey also argued that NATO m em bership wo uld not help Spain in its ef-
fo rts to rega in Gi bra ltar , since " it co uld be assum ed that o the r NATO m em bers w ou ld su p-
po rt Br ita in o n thi s issue" ("Spain and N ATO ") . In the end, th e most signifi can t d omes tic
suppo rt fo r NAT O m embership cam e from Sp an ish President Leopoldo So telo, w ho felt
t hat it wa s an ur gent m att er, since he belie ved "Spain 's ent ry into NATO w ould exped ite
negotiati ons fo r integrati o n into th e EC " ("S pain and NATO ") . T herefore , Spai n , backe d
by d o mes tic and internati onal suppo rt , complet ed th e ratifi cation pro cess and was ad mi tted
into the organizatio n in IY82.
German Reunification and the Inclusion of the Former GDR (1991)
The reunifi cati o n of C en nany on O cto be r 3 , 1990, prompted qu esti o ns ov er how ,
and w he ther, th e form e r G D R sho uld be ad mi tted in to NATO. Should it go th rough the
sam e type of accessio n pr o cess as Greece , T urk ey , the FRG , and Spai n? O r, sho uld it be
ushe red in to N AT O beca use th e FR G, w hic h alread y belo nge d to the organ izatio n , was
abso rbing it? T he U S, Fra nce, th e So viet Unio n , and the UK deter mined t hat th e reuni-
fied Ge rm an state w ould be treated " as a co n tin uatio n o f the Fed eral R epub lic of Cenlla ny
(FR G) ; an d th e FR C 's treaty co nun itme nts, in clud ing its parti c ipati on in N AT O , were
affirm ed as continu ing in effect." !' T w o treaties, th e " T reaty bet w ee n the FRG and th e
C crman D emo crati c R epu blic on the E stab lish m ent of Ge rm an U nity and th e T reaty o n
the Final Settlemen t With R espect to German y" affin lled that th e fa nner C D R w o uld Joi n
NA T O u nd er w hat w as pr ev io usly establi shed by th e FRC (Ack erman 4) . Full German
m em bership in N AT O took place o n M arch 15, 199 1.
1995 STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
After th e fo rme r GD R entered N AT O , th e Allian ce co nd ucted and publ ishe d the
199 5 Stud y on NAT O E nla rgement , in o rde r to co nsider " the m e rits o f ad m itt ing ne w
members and ho w they sho uld be b ro ugh t in ." 12 T he stu dy outli ned ce rtain cr ite ria th at
potential N ATO m embe r states shoul d d em onstra te , w hich were :
afuliCliol1 i llg democratic potiiica! svstcn! based Oil a mavtec! CWIIO/II)'; thefair treat-
II/CII I of lIIill or i/y populations; a conimitnicnt 10 tlic peacc/i,/ resolution ~f CO Iif/iClS;
the abi lil y and tlJilli llg ll CSS 10 mnlec a ntilitorv contribution 10 NATO opera tions,
and a COII/ ll l i l /I /CII I 10 democratic c;vil - lI l i li lary relations and instuutional structures.
(UNA T O E ll laf,R{'//{ct/ I ")
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T ogether , Allies w ou ld ud u iir new m ember states based on these c riteria and th eir
o ve rall j udgmen r of w he th e r " t he m embership of a specific co u nt ry wo uld co nt rib u te to
secur ity and stab ility in th e N orth Atlanrir area ."!' This study signaled a chan ge in ho w po-
tential m ember states would b e evaluated , since en trance cri te ria had ne ver been so plainl y
stated before. During th e Cold War, the member states m er el y abided by Arti cle 10 of th e
Washingt on Treaty, wh ich "explic itly stipu late d only one crite rio n (a Europ ean state) and
two pro cedural co nd it io ns for admitting n ew member s (a un animous in virario n from th e
member states and a depo sit o f the in strument of accession)." !' B y examining NATO's e n-
largements in 1999 and 2004 in light of rhe stand ards laid o ut in the 1') ')5 Stud y o n NATO
Enlargement, we can det ermine how closel y th e new m ember states mirrored the organi za-
rions new crite ria.
THE ACCESSION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, AND POLAND (1999)
In Febru ar y 19 ')8 , Pr esid ent Clinton remarked to th e Se nate , " T he accessio n o f Pol .m d .
Hungary , ,HI d the Czech R epublic to th e N orth Atlantic T reaty O rg.ni izati on (N AT O) w ill
improve th e ability of th e United Stares to protect and adva nc e our inter ests in th e rran sar-
lauri c area" (q uo ted in Bcbl cr '15). Clinton' s decision to end o rse these pro spective m em ber
states was based o n eac h co u n try's st ro ng reputations durin g the 1,),)Os, but did tht'y satisfy
th e c ri teria de scribed in th e 1'1')5 Stud y o n Enlargement?
In terms of ha ving a fu nctio ning d emocratic political system based o n a market econ-
omy, all three countri es more than satisfied this requirement pr ior to th e ir admi ssion in
1'1'19. As of 1998, Poland , Hungary. and the Czech R epublic all "had se ve n years o f so lid
re cords as stable d emo cra ci es] , .ind sincej 19 89 , Poland and the Czech R epublic hav e ea ch
held three tree parli.uuenta ry elections and Hungary , tw o ."1, Hungary " uph olds W estern
standa rds on human rights, freed om o f ex p ressio n , rule o f law , chec ks an d balance s amo ng
branch es of government, and indep endent judiciary, and effective lo cal gove rnlnellt,"l l,
while th e Czechs enjoyed "the benefits o f a fully functioning pa rliam curary d emo cracy,
including free spe ech, free assembly, and a vigorous , free press."!' Lik ewi se, the Polish b en -
efited from free and fair e lect io ns , a free press, and strong go ve rn me nt support for hun1~111
righ rs. I ~
By 19'18 , eac h o f th ese countries was qui ckl y m o ving toward s a free m ark et ec o n -
omy. Poland WdS admitted to the O rganizat io n o f Europ ean Cooperation and D e velop-
m ent (OEC D ) in 1996 , and since launching economic reforms in 198 '1, the country 's an-
nu al growth rat e W d S five percent (,IS o f 1997) (" Pol and 's Record"). The Czech R epublic
practi ced tight " fisca l and moneta ry poli cies, lib e rali zati on of trad e and pnces, and rapid
pri vatizat io n of sta re en te rp rises ].]" but it suffe red from trade and cur re nt ac co un t defic its
111 th e l1lid-1990s ("Czech Repu bli c 's") . Hunga ry , lik e Poland , joine d the OECD in 19%
and sh rank its current acco u nt d efi cit to less th an four percent o f its GDP in 19')6 , but it
remain ed relati vely high in per ca pita foreign debt ("Hungdry's R ecord").
With respect to th e fair treat m ent of minority populations, Hungary. th e Czec h Re-
public , and Poland " have e lnerged from the yo ke o f com m u nis m . . . [and] made trem endous
progress in fosterin g to le ra nce for J ewi sh and o the r reli gious minoriti es and e th nic gro ups .
[Also, property] restitution laws hav e been passed to restore to th eir lightful o w ne rs assets
stole n by communist regimes" (" E nJargen H"nt" 20) . These three co u nt ries have also dem-
onstrated a commitm eur to th e peaceful resoluti on of conflicts, which is evident by the fact
rhar th ey had no border di sputes leading up to th eir accessio n in 19'19 . Hungar y has 111-
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creased coop erati on with its eig ht neighboring cou ntries. while Polan d " de velo ped pa rticu -
larly strong ties with Lithu ani a and Ukraine . o ve rco m ing old tensio ns and reac h ing o u t to
them with proposals to establish P olish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukraini an peacekeeping bat-
talions" (" Po land 's Record") . Likewise, Czech relations with Slo vakia were characterized
as "fund.un eutally so u nd , al tho ug h so me disputes rcm ain led] in vol vin g the Czech-Slo vak
cu stoms union and residual matt ers stem m ing from th e January l lilJ3 split o f Czechoslova-
kin " ("Czech R epubli c 's") .
Hungary, the Czech R epubl ic, and Polan d all had th e ab ility and wil lingne ss to mak e
military co nt ributio ns to NATO operations. It was estimated th at th e three countries wo uld
add " 200,000 troops and a range of airfields, ports, and lin es of comm un icatio n to the
Allian ce 's co llect ive defense capabilities" (" E nlarg ement " 20). Also , as of llJ98, " Po land ,
th e C zec h R epublic , and Hu ngary [were] .. .co nt ribu ting m o re th an 1,000 tro op s to th e
N AT O - led mission in Bosnia" (" Enlargem e nt" 20). M oreo ver. C zechs sho wed th eir alle-
giance to enfo rcing internat io nal stability by figh ting w ith th e U S in the Gulf W ar. pa rrici-
pacing 111 UN peacekeeping m issions, and b eing fo und ing m embers of N AT O 's Partne rship
for Peace ("Czech Republi c 's"). However, it was estimated th at as of 1li98, th e "pro cess of
ge aring up th e arm ed fo rces fo r full NATO m embership [w ould] . . .tak e at least 10 yea rs." I')
These three Eu ropean co untries also d isplayed th e fifth and final criteri a o u tlined in
th e 1995 Stu dy o n Enla rgement: a co m mi nn en t to democrat ic civil- military relatio ns an d
institu tional structur es. In 19li7 , Poland m ade " stead y pro gress to ward th e estab lishm e nt o f
effective civilian control and parliamentary ov ersight of th e mil itary alo ng W estern lin es"
("PoLm u 's R ecord"). An other notable fact is that the Poli sh have an even hi g he r regard
for th eir armed forc es th an for th e Roman Ca tholic Church .:" In the Czech R epublic, the
Presiden t act s as Com ma nde r- in-Chief and the parliament has been a "pow erful player. ..
in qu estioning th e sco pe and directi on o f th e govern m cnt 's military restructurin g plans and
pr oposed defen se bu dget s" (" C zech R epubli c 's"). Hungar y co ntro ls its m ilitary through
its co nstitutio nal parliamenrary system , which gi ves th em "contro l o f th e m ilitary budget .
stru cture , deployment fi elding, stationing, and senio r lead ersh ip" (" H ungary 's R ecord ").
Inter estin gly, like th e Polish, the "Czech and Hungarian armi es. . .[also enj o yed] in their
respecti ve co u ntries m o re trust than th e leadin g civilian ins titutio ns" (Bebl er 55). Based
o n st ro ng publi c support fo r th e military , civil- mi litary relati ons seem ed to be quite go od
th rou gh out Poland, th e C zech R epubl ic. and Hungary , w hich mad e th em eve n m ore at-
tra cti ve as potential NATO m ember states. These three states recei ved high m arks in saris-
fYi ng th e criteria for NATO membership afte r the Cold W ar, w hich led to the ir e ve nt ual
accession in 1995J.21
THE ACCESSION OF ROMANIA, BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SLOVENIA, AND SLO-
VAKIA (2004)
Poland, th e C zech Republic , and Hungary were m ore than q ua lified to be come
NATO member stat es base d on th e ad m ission criteri a o utlined in th e 1995 Stu dy o n En-
largement . However , th e states that en tered In 2004 adher ed f~ll-IeSS clo sely to th e criteria .'2
All seven prospecti ve member states we re dem ocr acies (to varying degrees) that had .
or were establish ing, free m arket eco nomies . In parti cul ar, Slove nia wa s recognized for its
" stab le politi cal and eco no m ic env iro nmen t th at so me of th e o the r NATO invitee s [did] 110 /
enjoy ].]":" whi le Bu lgaria had also " develo pe d a stab le democrati c systeln Lj" .a fun cti oni ng
m ark et eco nom y[,] . .. [and has] held seve ral free and fair electio ns.":" Like wise , R omania's
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"major politi cal forces [were] ... connnittcd to democracy. free mark ets, and integration int o
iute ruario ual in stitutions" (B ugaj ski 4) , Some critics claimed , thou gh , that "Romania an d
Bul gari a co nrinue jd ] to sutl er from co rru ptio n in th eir go ve m ing structur es."e; As for Slova-
kia, the " markcrizarion of. ., [it s] eco no my has been relat ively succ essfu l].]" but th e co uurry
h;I S "fared wo rse economically th an th e Czech Re public ." eb
In terms o f tre atm ent o f its m ino rit y populations, B ulgaria had 1I0t "experi enced ;lny
sign ificant et hnic co nflicrsj.] although th e soc ial and econo m ic positio n of th e large R oma
m inority remain a po inr o f co nc ern " (Bugajsk i 3). Sim ilarly , R oni aui a Iu s ge ne rally ex pe-
rienced stabl e relatio ns with its minority popu lations, but it has experien ced some disputes
with the H un garian m ino rity and R oni a m inority, w hich "will reqUlre m ore intensive
gove rnm en tal and int ernati onal in volvcm eur" (B ugajs ki 4). R omani a and Bu lg;lria have also
demo nstrated th eir commitment to th e pea cefu l resolutio n o f co nflic ts and demo crati c civiJ-
military relati on s and institutional stru ctur es. B ulgaria "maintains good relati o ns with all of
its neighbo rs and has no o utstand ing dispuresj.j ' twhil e R omania has been a part of pea ce-
keeping mi ssions, regional secur ity ini tiatives, and played a "s tab ilizing rol e across seve ral
regions, in clu ding South East Eu rope and th e Black Sea zo ne " (B ugajs ki 4 , 5) , M oreo ver,
R omania enjoys fuJJ civilian co ntrol over its military, w hile Bulgaria is in th e process o f
co nso lidating democrat ic . civ ilian co n tro l of its armed forces (B ugaj sk i 3-4) ,
With respect to their w illingness to mak e military co n t ributio ns to N AT O , the se ve n
pros pective member co unt ries had already demo nstrated "enthusiasm and w illingness to
co ntribute to NATO-led operations in th e Balka ns, O peratio n Enduring Freedom, and
ISAF [(International Sec u rity Assistance Fo rce)] . " 27 Slovenia and Slov akia were undergoing
military refo rm prograllls to p rep ;tre themselves for entry into N ATO, and althoug h "Slo va-
kia is experiencing m an y of the ' no rm al' p robl ems associat ed with suc h a complex endeavo r,
their stra tegy is reali stic" (Sim o n 6). Lik ewise , Bulgaria has m ade substan tial progress "i n
th e restru ctnri ng of th e arm ed forces int o ;t modern and co m bar-readv m ilitary tailored to
NATO n eed s" (Bu gaj ski 3). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania " have been wi lling' to suppo rt
the U.S . and NATO farther afield , and are likely to serio usly focu s o n developing N ATO
niclu: defen se capabilities w ith the U. S. and Poland" (Sim o n 5). Regarding Romania. it
has worked w ith th e United Stat es to develop " m ilitary con tacts. throu gh j o in t exe rcises,
ed ucatio nal progr;tnls, and an ns co nt rac ts" . [whic h illustrates that R omania is] becoming
inc reasing ly interoperable With NATO and with Am erican for ces" (Bugaj ski 5) ,
Although th ese co un tries clearly illustrated th eir w illingness to m ake military co n-
tributio ns to NAT O , du e to t hei r small size and limited resources, th er e was und erlyin g
sen tim ent th at the " seven new m embers' physical an d institu tio nal capacit ies [w er e] .. .sub-
stant ially wcaleer tha n Po land , H un gary , and the Czech Repuhli c[,]"which wo uld translate
into " m odes t con tribu tio ns to Alliance d efen se . [but] prov ide valuable politi cal and straregic
suppo rt to th e U nited States in th e adv ance m ent of [its] . .. in terests in Europe .. .and h elp
bridge th e transatl anti c gap" (Sim o n 3, 7) . H arsher critics wen t so tn as saying tha t th e new
member states would "[ n je ither in quali ty nor qu antity" .m ak e a substanti ve differen ce in
N ATO 's military poten tial.":" T his led SOllie to vie w th e 2004 acce ssio n w ith " lowered ,
more so be r and realistic ex pectatio ns" (Simo n 4). N onetheless, th e member stares un aru-
mously agreed to ;tccep t Est onia, Latvi a, Lithuania, R omania , Bulgaria, Slov ak ia, and Slo-
ve nia into the o rgan izatio n o n March 29, 2004,
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After
64 EVAN JAROFF Clare mon t McKenna College
THE ACCESSION PROCESS FOR THE ENLARGEMENTS OF 1999 AND 2004
Al th ou gh it can he di sputed how well th e m ember sta tes in N ATO's fifth ro u nd of
eulargcmeur ad he red to the crite ria laid o u t in th e 1995 Stu dy 0 11 Enla rgemeut. the .icc es-
sio n pr o cesses for th e fourth and fifth ro unds we re quite sun ilar. First. th e pro sp ecti ve sta tes
were inv ited to access io n talks at NATO h ead qu art e rs in Brussel s. Aft er th ese talks, th e
invitees se nt letter s o f intent to join NATO , alo ng with J tim etable o u tlining w he n th ey
exp ect ed to finish reforms that were suggested d uring the access io n talks. So me o f th ese
reforms revol ved around target force goal s (T FG) th at th e sup reme allied com m ande r in Eu-
ro pe (SACEUR) set in response to a defen se planning qu esti onnaire (D PQ) that eac h state
co m ple ted d u ring th e accession process. " In th e third ste p , each invitee sigll ed an accessio n
pro to col that allowed the invited countri es to be wri tte n into the Washington Treat y. The
fo u rt h ste p occurred w he n the NATO m ember co untries ratified the accession pro to cols. III
th e fifth step, NATO 's Secre tary G en eral in vit ed th e potential new member states to accede
to th e N orth Atl anti c Trea ty." After th e in vitees ac ceded to th e North Atlantic Treat y, th ey
dep osit ed th eir in struments o f accessio n w it h th e U S Sta te D epartment, w hic h m ad e th em
fo rma l m embers o f N ATO (" NATO Enlargemeut").
The o nly difference betw een th e pro cess in 1099 and t he pro cess in 2004 , wa s that
th e se ve n m ember co untries that joined ill 2004 had parti cipated in th e M embershi p Action
Plan (MA P) JI The MAP, w hic h began ill 19 S1 Sl . w as created to " he lp cou ntrie s aspiring to
NATO m embership In their preparati o ns " (" Enhan cing Senility " 7). Each o f th e seve n
states th at joine d NATO in 2004 enrolled in th is pro gram , w hich incl ude d " bo t h politi cal
and technical advice, JS well as annual m eetings bet w een all NATO m embers and ind iv id ua l
aspirants" (" E n hancing Security" 7). Althou gh thi s is not officially p;Jrt of th e accession pro-
ce ss, th er e is 110 doubt that the MA P pr ogram helped the seven aspirant co u ntr ies pr ep are
for NATO membership,
COMPARING ACCESSION CRITERIA
Although th e e nd of th e Cold W ar signaled a chan gc 1I1 global sec uri ty stra tegy , th e
criteri a used to determine p erspecti ve NATO m ember states has remain ed relati vel y co n-
stant. Sc holar M ark Smith notes th at joi ning :
NA TO durill~ the Cold rFar incant mote tlian o[quirill.J1 a nudcaiiscd sem ri,l'
.J!lwralltee. It entailed signill.J! IIpJj irst, to the ideo oftl« vJ!est: the deepellill,\? IIJ('b <l
politica l, economic and ideol0.J!i[ollill ka,f!. es that c!!,rell' up in the pressurin.J! atinosphen:
(!f the Cold kVor . Second, i' cntailct! suvscribing to 011 indi}!cllolls balanc« (!f polI'er
within this ueb : a svstciu that lI'as rcconstitutctl ill the A lliance vy expL1llilill.J! its
parameters rather tluin its nu-dianisnis. (Smith 176)
Sm ith 's words still ring true to day . w hic h is evident hy exam ining the cri teria de-
scribe d 111 the 1Sl95 Study on Enl argem ent. The belief In a functi oning demo cr ati c p o lit ical
system based on a mark et econo my , th e ( Ii I' tr eatment of minority populations, th e peaceful
resolut io n o f conflict s, and a co m m itm ent to democratic civil-military relati ons and insti-
tuti on al st ructu res are all n ot ion s engrained in Western ideology. While th ey w ere not ex-
plicitl y listed ;IS c rite ria durin g the C old W ar , th ey were certainl y co rne rstones of th e types
o f Weste rn democracies that NATO so ugh t to attra ct . As for th e ability and wi llingne ss to
m ak e a military contributio n to N ATO o pe ratio ns, thi s was clea rly J co ns ideratio n during
Cold Wa r enlarge me nt (alt hough less so in the case o f Greece). sin ce NATO wou ld ha ve
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d iffic ulty o perating as a successfu l sec urity o rgan izat io n without stro ng and lo yal mili tary
participation. There fore, th e 1<,) 95 Stu dy on Enlargement see ms to have been a m od em an d
co ntem po rary attempt at definin g key criteria fo r potenrial NATO m ember stat es that , at
leas t in essen ce , had been adh ered to during C old W ar expansion.
As demonstr ated earlier, th e co un tries accepted into NATO In 1999 were ex cellent
exa m ples of states that satisfie d the ne w e nlarge m ent crite ria. H o wever, th e state s th at ac-
ced ed in 2004 fell rather short o f fulfilling th e crite ria, espec ially w he n it cam e to each co u n-
try's ability to m ake milita ry co ntrib ut io ns to N ATO . Although th is seem s lik e th e main
crite ria for NATO membership (o r membership in any secu rity o rga niza tio n) , th e mi lita ry
benefits o f ad d ing th ese countri es pal ed in comparison to the 1999 accession stat es. In o rde r
to ex plain th e 2004 accessions, I wou ld em phasize that NATO's und erlying criter ia for
persp ecti ve m ember states is th at th ey contri b ute to th e "secu ri ty and stab ility in th e N o rt h
Atl anti c area" ("Enha ncing Security" 6) . Wh ile th eir military contrib u tio ns m ake be wea k,
their comrnirmcnr to pea ce an d d emocracy h elp s stabilize th e pot enti ally unstable regions o f
Central and E astern Europe. f o r an o rgan ization th at has expand ed fronl tw elve to tw ent y-
six particip ants, NATO mi ght have realized th at it is just as beneficial to invite countri es that
p rom ote sec ur ity throu gh th e practice of co mmo n political and id eological beli efs, rather
than throu gh th e number o f actua l fo rces th at th e y co ntri bute . T hi s m ay prove to be more
important w it h fu ture en largem ents, as th e numbe r of states th at ex e m plify th e 1995 cr ite ria
seems to be w ani ng.
COMPARING THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Alth ou gh accessio n dec isions made du rin g th e Cold W ar foll owed the outline in the
No rt h Atlantic Treaty and were carefu lly planned , debated , and ag reed upon unanim ously
by ,III m em ber states, post-C old W ar accessio ns have foll o w ed a mo re st ru ct ured appro ach .
The pro cess d u ring th e C o ld W ar was largel y influen ced by NATO 's st ro nge st pla yer, th e
United States, w hich often fo u nd itsclf lobb yiu g fo r enlarge m ent . This is less appa re nt today,
as m or e of th e weight is placed on aspirin g m ember countries th at are subj ect to va ryi ng
reform s (like th e MAP) befo re beginning accessio n talks. The MAP almost ac ts as ,I pre-
limina ry step i n the accession pro cess, w hich is a sign that NATO m embership is beco m in g
increasin gly deliberate . While so m e m ay view a stri ct e r and m o re stru ct u red process as a
hin d ran ce to fut ure enlargeme nt, I tend to side with Sm ith , w ho states, " [N AT O ] is st ill
an allian ce o f choice, but th e responsibil ity o f the All ian ce to choose wisely is m ore im -
portant than it has ev er bee n ." .J2 While cri teria for membership lIlay be lo o sen in g sin ce the
C old W ar, th e more str ingent accession pro cess places a gr eate r focus on inv itin g co untries
th at w ill co n tin ue to uph old th e goa ls o f th e Alliance in th e future. However, th ese goals
seem to be changi ng as NAT O places less em p hasis on pe rsp ective member states for their
m ilita ry contribut ions, and m ore em pha sis o n shared ideol ogies. T he re is no d oubt th at thi s
will impact N AT O in th e future, ,IS it m o ves further and furth e r aw ay h om its o rigi ns as ,I
military organ izatio n.
END NOTES
1. M ark Sm ith , N ATO Enlargement during th e C old War (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 26.
I rel y h eavily o n Smit h's analysis for th e fir st part o f thi s paper, since it is o ne o f
th e best. an d few, so urces on NAT O expansio n duri ng th e Cold War .
2 . Sm ith 25. The "Washington Pap er" was actually cr afted by a Working Grou p CO I11-
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After
66 EVAN JAROFF Clarem ont McKenna College
p riscd of" llliddle-eche lo ll d iplomats" w ho had a g rea te r deg ree o f Independ ence
tha n th e upper level .uuh.issado rial sta ff at th e WET. Canada, th e US . and th e UK
w ere the dominant parti es in thi s gro up. alld th ey basica lly headed ti ll" d raft-
in g and disscuunution o f the "Washingt on Paper" to Belgium . the N etherl ands.
Fra nce, Lu xem bo ur g . and th eir own stares for th eir co nside ration .
J. " T he N orth A tlant ic Treat y." N orth Atlanti c Treaty O r§!<1I1izat ion , 2l) N ov. 2007,22
M arch 2009 < h tt p :/ / w ww.na to.i nt / d o cu / basictxr/t rcaty.hun > .
4. "The N orth Atlanti c Tr eat y" Articl e 5 states:" T he Part ies agree th at an arm ed attac k
aga inst one or m ore o f them in Europe o r North Ameri ca shall be co nside red an
attack against them all and co nsequ ently they agrec th at , if such an ar m ed attack
o cc ur s, each o f th em . in exe rcise of th e right o f indiv id ual o r co llec tive self-de-
fence recogn ised by Art icle 5 1 o f th e C harter o f th e U nited Natio ns, wi ll assist th e
Party or Parti es so att acked by tak ing fo rthwith , indi vidu ally and in conce rt w ith
th e o ther Parties, suc h action as it d eems necessary. including the use o f armed
force , to resto re and m aintain th e sec u rity of th e N orth Atlantic area."
5 . " Final C o mm u nique ," NAT O On-l in e Lib rary. 2 A p ril 2009 <http:/ / w w w.n ato.int /
d o cu /coJ11ru / 49- 95 /c4909 1h .h tm > . During N AT O 's fir st m eeting in Washing-
to n on September 17 . 1949 . th e m ember states c reated a D efen se C o m m itt ee, a
Military C ommittee with a Military Stand ing Gro up. and five R egi o nal Planning
Gro ups. The Sta nding Group was created as a sub - co m mi tree " to facilitate the
rapid and efficie nt co nd uc t o f the wo rk of the Militar y Connnittee." The meeting
also established that th e Stand ing C ro u p sho u ld be m ad e up of o ne rep resentative
from France, the U K . ,1l1d th e U S.
6. Sm ith 81. "The eve ntual decision was cle arly em erg ing: th e US had co me o u t in favo r
o f ad miss io n , Br itain was un willin g to oppose th e U S, and th e othe r members
were waiting o n the Bri tish positi on ."
7 . Sm ith 124 . Sm ith qu ote s M ich ael Sn irm er, ,I G er man historian and ad visor to
H elmut Koh l in th e J <:m os.
8. Also, the membe r states looked to th e United States fo r gllld,1rlCe, and th ey w ere
hesitant to o bject to the strong Ame rican opinio n to back th e FRG 's accession .
Fran ce, bein g o ne of the th ree sta tes 111 th e powerf u l Stand ing Group. felt that it
co u ld at least c hallenge th e US, since it was o f eq ual stance w ithi n NAT O.
Y. Smith 158. " NATO 's key task fo r its m em be r states was the foster ing o f cohesio n and
by extensio n th e iinplement urion of habits o f cooperatio n ."
10. " Spain and NATO ," Country Stud ies. 2 April 2009 < hrtpr/ vco un trys tud ics.us/
spain/ Sd .h tm > . The " r ival blocks" re fer to th e Un ite d Stat es and the Soviet
U n ion .
11. D avid M. Acke rm an . " N ATO Enlargement: Se nate Ad vice and Conse nt," C RS R e-
port for Congress. 2 May 2003 : 4.
12. " N AT O enlarge m ent ." N orth Atlantic Tre<l ty Or~J n i z a ti o n , 18 Feb. 20 09 . 22 M arch
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7
C1aremont-U C Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 67
200') <htrp.v zwwwnato.int / issues/ enlargeme nt/ index .hrml > .
13. "Enhancing Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargem ent ." NATO
Puhli c DiplOlmcy Division (2004).
14. Am on A. Bebler, ed. ,The Ch,d le n~f of NATO Enlargem ellt (Westpo rt : Praegcr Pub-
lishers, I ')')')) 49.
15. "T he Enlargement of NATO," Public Info rmation Ser ies: U.S. D epartment of State,
Feb. 1998: 19.
I (l . "Hungary's Reco rd in M eeting NATO 's Standards," U.S. State D epartillent, 15
Au g. 1997,21 March 2009 < http://w w \V.state.gov/ www/ regio ns/ eur /
fs_970815hungary_n ato. htrnl > .
17. "T he Czech Republic's R ecord in Meeting NATO's Standards." U.S. State D epart-
m ent, 15 Aug. 1')97,21 M arch 2009 <http://www.state.gov /www/regiollS/ eur/
fs_970 8 15czech_ nato. htllll> .
18. " Poland 's Record in Meeting NATO 's Standards." U.S. State D epartment, 15
Aug. 1997, 21 March 2009 < http:/ / w ww.st;ne .gov /www / regions/ eur /
fs_970815polaIlCCnato.htllll > .
19. Otto Pick, "T he Czech R epublic and Western Integrati on ," in The Challen ge of
NATO Enlargem ent, ed .Anton A. Behler (Westport : Praeger Publi shers, 199'))
108. Ten years was Pick 's private assessmen t of th e situat ion in Poland .
20. Bebler 55. "The armed forces as a rule have continued to enJoy a high de gree of
esteem from the population. lu Poland they have retained the first place among
all public instituti on s and thus outdistanced even th e once most popular Polish
institution - the R oman Ca tholic Church ."
21. Wade jacoby," M ilitary cOlnpe te nce versus poli cy loyalty: ce ntral Europe and trans-
atlanti c relation s," in The Atlantic Allian ce Under Stress, ed . Da vid M . Andrews
(Cambridge: Ca mb ridge University Press, 200 5) 244-245, 254 . Jacoby felt that
Poland, Hungary, and th e Czech R epublic matched US and NATO politi cal
ideologies, but co uld provide less military support (other than nich e forces) to th e
organization than othe r member state s. The autho r argues that admi tt ing th ese
three countries into NATO allowed "the United states to fulfill its desire for a
broader coa litio n o f th e willing and [Poland, Hungary, and the Cz ech republic]...
to dem on strate that willin gn ess given limi ted means."
22 . This asserti on is based up on the information available to me about th e 200 4 acces-
sio n states pri o r to th eir ent ry in to NATO (which is mu ch less co mpared to the
plethora o f information found o n th e preparedn ess of the 1999 accession states).
23. Jeffrey Sim on, " Prepared Statement for Committee o n Foreign R elati on s: U nited
Stat es Senate Hearing on NATO Enl argem ent,' 3 April 2003 : 6.
24. Janusz Bu gajski, "The Future of NATO : Do Bulgaria and Romania Q ualify?" U.S.
Semte Com mittee on Forei~n R elati ons, 3 April 2003: 3.
25 . Paul E. Callis, " N ATO Enlargem ent ," C R.S R eport for Congress, 5 M ay 2003: 5
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After
68 EVAN lAROH Claremo nt M cKenna College
26. Z o lt.m D. Baran y. The Fu ture o f NATO Exp an sion (Ca nih ridgc : Ca m bridge Un iver-
sity Press, 2003) 52.
27 , Ian Brzezinski , "S tatemen t by Ian Brz ezinski, Depu ty Assistant Secretary of D efense
fo r Euro pean and N AT O Affairs," Se nate Forei ~ll Reb tio m Cou uu ittcc. 3 April
2003: 5.
28 , Thomas S. Szuyna," T he Fu tur e of NAT O and E nlargement ," R AN D Corpo rJtio n ,
April 2002: 5.
29. Wad e j aco by, " M ilitary Com pe tence Ver sus Policy Loyalty : Central Europe an d Trans-
atlantic R elatio ns,' in The Atlant ic Alliance Under Stress, ed . David M . And rew s
(Ca m br idge: Ca m br idge Uni versity Press, 2005). 245-2 46. T hese mil itar y refo rms
were part o f NATO's De fe nse C apabilities In itiat ive (D C I) to " ensu re that all
NATO mem ber co unt ries had co m patible equipme nt , per so nnel , and training,"
H oweve r, th e per spect ive m ember states were' no t str ict ly held acc o unt able for
th e D C I. since some co un tries (like Hungary) ente red N AT O w ith o u t ac hiev ing
mil itary co m patibility with NATO .
30. T his was basically a formal invitatio n by the Secret ar y Ge neral that acknowledged that
all o f th e me m ber states had accep ted th e acc essio n prot ocol s fo r the per spective
m em ber states.
3 I , jaco by 237, When Poland , the C zech R epubli c, and Hungary we re perspect ive m em-
ber states ,"the All iance had no sign ifican t p rograms to prepJ re the ne w stares for
m embership." See j aco by'sT he Enlarge ment o f the Eu ro pean U nion :llId N AT O
fo r m o re informatio n ,
32, Smith 177,
WORKS CITED
Ackerman , David M, " N AT O E nlargemen t: Sena te Ad vice and Conse nt. " C RS Repo rt
for Con~ress, 2 M ay 2003,
Asmus, R o nald D ., and F, Stephen Larrab ce , "NATO and th e H ave-Nets: R eassuranc e
afte r E nlarge me nt. " Foreign Att:lirs 75 (1996): 13- 20.
Barany, Z o ltan D . The Future of N ATO E xpa nsio n. Ca m bridge : Cam bridge U ni vers ity
Pr ess, 2003.
Be bler, An to n A., cd. T he C hallenge of NATO En.la r~emen t. W estport: P raeger Publish-
e rs, 1999.
Brzezinski. Ian . " Staten le nt by Ian B rzez inski D epu ty Assistant Secretary of D efen se for Eu -
rop eall and NATO Aff;lirs." Senate Fo re ign R ela tio ns Couuu itree . 27 Ma rc h 2003.
BugaJski , j anusz. "The Fu tur e of NATO : Do Bulgaria an d R oma nia Qualify?" U .S. Se n-
ate Conlln itt ee o n Fore i ~n R elat ions. 3 Ap ril 2003.
C linto n, Will i:lIn J. "To the Sena te of the United States." The C hallenge of NATO En -
la r~ement. Ed . Anton A . Beble r.
"The C zech R epublic 's Reco rd in Meeting N ATO's Standa rds." U .S. State D ep art-
m en t . IS Aug. 1097. 21 M arc h 2009 < http://w ww .stJ te,go v/www / regio m /e ur/
r,_97U1j l Sczechj naro .h tml > .
"T he E nlargeme nt of N AT O. " P ub lic Infon n:Hio n Se ries: United States D ep artme nt of
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 69
State . February 1,)YH.
"E nhancing Securi ty and Extendin g Stab ility through NATO Enl argement." NAT O P uh -
lic [) ipl oill acy D ivisio n, 2004.
" Fin,d Commun ique." NATO O n-Jine Lih r'lI"y . 2 April 2009 < hn p.z/www.na to.i nt/
doc u/ co mill I 4')-')51c490') 17a.htrn > .
Callis , PaId E. " N AT O Enlargeme nt ." CRS Report fo r Cong ress. Ma y 5, 200.1.
"Hungary's R eco rd in Meeting N ATO 's Standards." U.S . Stat e Dep,lrtme llt. 15 A ug . 1997 .
21 M arch 200') <http://www .st<lt e .gov/www/regio ns/ eur lfs_.)70H15hu ngary_n.lto .
hrml> .
J acob y, W ad e. "M ilitary C ompet ence Versus Policy Lo yalt y: Central Europe and Trau sut-
lanti c R elati ons." The Atl an tic Allian ce Under Stress. Ed . David M. Andrews. Ca n 1-
bridge: C am bridge University Press, 2005.
" N ATO e nlarge m e nt. " North Atlantic T reaty Organi zati o n. 1R Feb. 2009. 22 M arch 2009
<h ttp :/ /www. nato .mt/iss ues/ e nlargeme nt / Indcx.html > .
"The N orth Atl antic Treaty ." N o rth Atlantic T rea ty Or~a niza tion. 29 N o v. 2007 . 22
M arch 2009 . < h ttp:/ / ww w .nato. in t/ docu / basic txtitreaty .htlll> .
" Po land' s R eco rd in Meeting NATO 's Standards." U. S. St,lte D epartment. 15 Au g. 1') ')7.
21 M arch 200') <http :/ / w ww .sLlte .gov/www/regio ns/ eurlfs_ 970815 poland_uato .
html > .
Pick , O tto . " T he Czech R epubl ic and Weste rn Integrati on ." The Ch,lllen~e of NATO
Enlargement. Ed . Anto n A. Be bler.
Simon, J effre y. "Prepared Statement for Commi tte e on Foreign Relations: United States
Senate H earing on NATO Enlargcni cut. " 3 Ap ril 200.1.
Smith , M ark . NATO Enlargem ent d un ng the Cold W ar . N ew York: Palgrave, 200 0.
"S pain and NAT O ." Country Stud ies. 2 April 2009 < h ttp :/ / co untrystudies. us/spain/ HH.
hrm > .
Szayna , Thomas S. " T he Future of N ATO and Enlargeme nt ." RAND Corpora tio n. April
2002.
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After
70 EVAN JAROFF Clarem ont M cKenna College
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7
